Rahul Agarwal Vs. State of West Bengal & . Anr. [Criminal Appeal No. ______ of 2025 @ SLP (Crl.) No. 5518 of 2025], delivered by K. Vinod Chandran, J., with B.R. Gavai, C.J.I. concurring, in both English and Telugu for your legal and translation analysis. 1. Issue before the court The issue was whether a Judicial Magistrate has the power to direct a person (including a witness) to provide a voice sample during investigation when the case arose under the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), which had no explicit provision for such direction. The High Court had set aside the Magistrate’s order relying on a pending reference to a Larger Bench. 2. Improper approach by the High Court The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in refusing to follow the binding precedent in Ritesh Sinha v. State of U.P. (2019 8 SCC 1), on the ground that a reference was pending. The reference was later closed without decision; therefore, Ritesh Sinha remained binding law. The Court criticized the High Court for “egregiously entertaining” an unnecessary challenge contrary to settled law. 3. Facts leading to the appeal The case arose from the death of a 25-year-old married woman in 2021, followed by mutual allegations between her family and her husband’s family. The Investigating Officer sought to collect a voice sample from the second respondent, alleged to have threatened a witness on behalf of the deceased’s father. The Magistrate allowed the request; the High Court set it aside; hence the appeal. 4. Core constitutional question Whether directing a person to give a voice sample violates Article 20(3) (protection against self-incrimination). The respondent argued that compelling a witness to give a voice sample could later lead to incrimination if he were made an accused. 5. Reliance on binding precedents The Court relied on two precedents: State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (AIR 1961 SC 1808) — Held that obtaining specimen handwriting, signature, or fingerprints does not amount to testimonial compulsion and hence does not violate Article 20(3). Ritesh Sinha v. State of U.P. (2019 8 SCC 1) — Applied the same principle to voice samples, holding that even though Cr.P.C. lacked explicit provision, the Magistrate is empowered to order such collection. 6. Nature of voice samples — not self-incriminatory The Court reaffirmed that a voice sample, like a fingerprint or handwriting sample, is “material evidence” used only for comparison. It is not a statement or testimony revealing guilt by itself. Therefore, taking such a sample does not violate Article 20(3) of the Constitution. 7. Application of law under Cr.P.C. and BNSS Even under the old Cr.P.C., Ritesh Sinha authorizes Magistrates to order voice samples. Under the new Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, Section 349 expressly provides for such power. Hence, either way, the Magistrate’s order was legally valid. 8. No need to reopen the issue Since Ritesh Sinha settled the question and the Larger Bench reference was closed, there was no reason to reconsider the matter. The High Court’s reliance on a pending reference was misconceived. 9. Final holding The High Court’s order was set aside. The Magistrate’s order restored. The second respondent was directed to give the voice sample as required by the Investigating Officer. 🧩 Summary of Legal Principles Voice samples do not amount to testimonial compulsion under Article 20(3). The Magistrate has inherent judicial power to order collection of such samples, even under Cr.P.C. BNSS 2023 (Section 349) now expressly authorizes such directions. Binding precedents must be followed until overruled; a pending reference does not suspend their effect. The High Court’s contrary view was legally unsustainable. TELUGU 1. కోర్టు ఎదుట ఉన్న ప్రశ్న న్యాయమూర్తి (Magistrate) ఒక వ్యక్తిని (అభియుక్తుడు గానీ సాక్షి గానీ) వాయిస్ సాంపిల్ ఇవ్వమని ఆదేశించగలడా అనే ప్రశ్న ప్రధానంగా ఉంది. ఈ కేసు Cr.P.C. అమలులో ఉన్నప్పుడు జరిగింది; అందులో వాయిస్ సాంపిల్ సేకరణకు స్పష్టమైన నిబంధన లేదు. హైకోర్టు ఈ కారణంతో మేజిస్ట్రేట్ ఆదేశాన్ని రద్దు చేసింది, పెద్ద బెంచ్‌కి రిఫరెన్స్ ఉందని పేర్కొంది. 2. హైకోర్టు తప్పుగా వ్యవహరించడం సుప్రీం కోర్టు అభిప్రాయపడి చెప్పింది: హైకోర్టు Ritesh Sinha v. State of U.P. (2019) తీర్పును పట్టించుకోకుండా ఉండడం తప్పు. పెద్ద బెంచ్‌కి చేసిన రిఫరెన్స్ తరువాత మూసివేయబడింది, కాబట్టి Ritesh Sinha తీర్పు బైండింగ్గా ఉంటుంది. హైకోర్టు తప్పు విధంగా ఒక అకాడెమిక్ (academic) ప్రశ్నను వినిపించింది. 3. కేసు నేపథ్యం 25 ఏళ్ల యువతి 2021లో మరణించగా, ఇరువురు కుటుంబాల మధ్య అవమానాలు, వేధింపులు, దోపిడీ ఆరోపణలు వచ్చాయి. విచారణలో మృతురాలి తండ్రి తరఫున రెండవ ప్రతివాది (respondent no. 2) ఒక సాక్షిని భయపెట్టాడని సమాచారం లభించింది. అందుకని వాయిస్ సాంపిల్ తీసుకోవాలని పోలీస్ అభ్యర్థన మేరకు మేజిస్ట్రేట్ అనుమతి ఇచ్చాడు, కాని హైకోర్టు దానిని రద్దు చేసింది. 4. రాజ్యాంగ ప్రశ్న – Article 20(3) స్వీయ-దోషారోపణ నిషేధం (Self-incrimination bar) కింద వాయిస్ సాంపిల్ ఇవ్వమని బలవంతం చేయడం అసాధ్యమా అని ప్రతివాది వాదించాడు. సాక్షి తరువాత అభియుక్తుడిగా మారితే తనపైనే ఆధారాలు ఏర్పడతాయి అని ఆందోళన వ్యక్తం చేశాడు. 5. ఆధారమైన తీర్పులు State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (AIR 1961 SC 1808) — చేతిరాత, సంతకం, వేలిముద్రలు వంటి నమూనాలు తీసుకోవడం సాక్ష్యాధార compulsive testimony కాదు, కాబట్టి Article 20(3) ఉల్లంఘన కాదు. Ritesh Sinha v. State of U.P. (2019 8 SCC 1) — వాయిస్ సాంపిల్ కూడా అదే తరహా సాక్ష్యం, కాబట్టి మేజిస్ట్రేట్ ఆదేశించవచ్చు అని తీర్పు చెప్పింది, Cr.P.C.లో స్పష్టమైన నిబంధన లేకపోయినా. 6. వాయిస్ సాంపిల్ స్వభావం వాయిస్ సాంపిల్ ఒక భౌతిక సాక్ష్యం (material evidence) మాత్రమే; స్వయంగా నేరాన్ని నిరూపించదు. ఇది fingerprint లేదా handwriting sample లాగే — కేవలం పోలిక కోసం ఉపయోగపడుతుంది. కాబట్టి, ఇది Article 20(3) కింద స్వీయ-సాక్ష్యం కాదు. 7. Cr.P.C. మరియు BNSS అన్వయము Cr.P.C. ప్రకారం — Ritesh Sinha తీర్పు ఆధారంగా మేజిస్ట్రేట్‌కు సాధికారాధికారం ఉంది. BNSS 2023 (Section 349) ప్రకారం — వాయిస్ సాంపిల్ సేకరణకు స్పష్టమైన అధికారం ఉంది. రెండు చట్టాల కిందా మేజిస్ట్రేట్ ఆదేశం చట్టబద్ధం. 8. ప్రశ్నను మళ్ళీ పరిశీలించాల్సిన అవసరం లేదు Ritesh Sinha ఇప్పటికే స్పష్టత ఇచ్చింది; పెద్ద బెంచ్ రిఫరెన్స్ మూసివేయబడింది, కాబట్టి తీర్పును తిరిగి తెరచాల్సిన అవసరం లేదు. హైకోర్టు తీసుకున్న కారణం తప్పు మరియు అప్రయోజనకరమైనది. 9. తుది నిర్ణయం హైకోర్టు ఆదేశం రద్దు చేయబడింది. మేజిస్ట్రేట్ ఆదేశం పునరుద్ధరించబడింది. రెండవ ప్రతివాది (respondent no. 2) తన వాయిస్ సాంపిల్ ఇవ్వాలి అని ఆదేశించబడింది. 🔍 తాత్పర్యం / న్యాయ సారాంశం వాయిస్ సాంపిల్ తీసుకోవడం Article 20(3) ఉల్లంఘన కాదు. మేజిస్ట్రేట్‌కు చట్టపరమైన అధికారం ఉంది — Cr.P.C. అయినా, BNSS అయినా. Ritesh Sinha (2019) తీర్పు బైండింగ్ ప్రిసిడెంట్. పెండింగ్ రిఫరెన్స్ ఉన్నప్పటికీ హైకోర్టు తీర్పును విస్మరించడం తప్పు. . . JUDGEMENT Rahul Agarwal Vs. State of West Bengal & Anr. [Criminal Appeal No._________ of 2025 @ SLP (Crl.) No. 5518 of 2025] K. Vinod Chandran, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. A purely academic question covered by a binding precedent of this Court, is agitated unnecessarily by the respondent herein and entertained egregiously by the High Court. The High Court has also refused to follow the binding precedent of this Court on the ground that there is a reference made to a Larger Bench. The reference, as pointed out by the appellant, has been closed unceremoniously, on default. 3. The records of the appeal reveal that a young married woman of 25 years of age died on 16.02.2021, which led to an allegation of harassment and torture at the matrimonial home and counter allegation that the deceased together with her parents misappropriated cash and jewellery belonging to the family of the husband. A cousin of the husband of the deceased filed a complaint before the police in which the deceased's father and mother were arrayed as accused. Upon investigation the Investigating Officer (I.O) was informed that the 2nd respondent acted as the agent of the father of the deceased and threatened a witness who alleged that he was privy to the extortion demand made by the father through the 2nd respondent. The I.O hence required the 2nd respondent to be subjected to a voice sample test for which collection of the voice sample was sought before the jurisdictional Magistrate's Court. To this end, a petition, Annexure P11 was filed before the jurisdictional Magistrate which was allowed by Annexure P13 order. 4. The second respondent challenged the same before the High Court and the High Court by the impugned order set aside the order of the Magistrate finding that a similar question was referred to a Larger Bench. As has been rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the said reference has been closed as per Appendix B. 5. We have heard Mr. Dama Sheshadri Naidu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants-complainant and Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee, learned Counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent, whose voice sample is to be taken. The learned counsel for the respondent vehemently argued that the order was passed when the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) was in force and though Section 349 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 empowered the Magistrate to pass an order inter alia directing a person to provide a voice sample, the Cr.P.C. does not have any such provision. It is this issue which has been referred for consideration before the Larger Bench. 6. The reference, as we see from the questions extracted in the impugned order, was whether the direction of this Court enabling the Magistrate to pass an order directing the accused to provide a voice sample would apply in the case of a witness. In the present case, the question is raised especially on the ground that it would lead to infringement of the right of the witness under Article 20(3), which on comparison of the voice sample could result in arraigning the witness as an accused. 7. The question squarely arose in Ritesh Sinha v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (Crl. Appeal No.2003 of 2012)1 dated 02.08.2019 based on which the reference was made. This Court was concerned with a conversation between two accused who were alleged to have collected money from different people on the promise of jobs, which did not materialise. The specific question raised was with respect to the Magistrate not being empowered to pass an order directing furnishing of a voice sample. This Court referred to the judgment in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad2, wherein an identical plea of self-incrimination in providing specimen handwriting, signature or finger impression was considered in the following manner: "(12) In order that a testimony by an accused person may be said to have been self-incriminatory, the compulsion of which comes within the prohibition of the constitutional provision, it must be of such a character that by itself it should have the tendency of incriminating the accused, if not also of actually doing so. In other words, it should be a statement which makes the case against the accused person at least probable, considered by itself. A specimen handwriting or signature or finger impressions by themselves are no testimony at all, being wholly innocuous, because they are unchangeable; except, in rare cases where the ridges of the fingers or the style of writing have been tampered with. They are only materials for comparison in order to lend assurance to the Court that its inference based on other pieces of evidence is reliable. They are neither oral nor documentary evidence but belong to the third category of material evidence which is outside the limit of 'testimony'." "(32). It has to be noticed that Article 20(3) of our Constitution does not say that an accused person shall not be compelled to be a witness. It says that such a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself. The question that arises therefore is: Is an accused person furnishing evidence against himself, when he gives his specimen handwriting, or impressions of his fingers, palm or foot? The answer to this must, in our opinion, be in the negative." 8. Following the aforesaid precedent, it was held in Ritesh Sinha1 that despite absence of explicit provisions in Cr.P.C., a Judicial Magistrate must be conceded the power to order a person, to give a sample of his voice for the purpose of investigation for a crime. We specifically note that this Court had not spoken only of the accused and specifically employed the words 'a person', consciously because the Rule against selfincrimination applies equally to any person whether he be an accused or a witness. It was also directed that till explicit provisions are incorporated in the Cr.P.C., the Judicial Magistrate will be so empowered by virtue of the said judgment. The issue was also pending with the Government and with the advent of the BNSS, it has been specifically incorporated under Section 349. 9. We need not hence consider the question as to whether it is the Cr.P.C. or the BNSS which would be applicable to the present case. If it is the Cr.P.C., the three Judge Bench decision in Ritesh Sinha1 permits the same on the identical principle adopted by this Court in Kathi Kalu Oghad2 to permit furnishing of handwriting, signature and finger impressions. The said sampling is similar to voice sampling, as now possible by reason of the advancing technology. If it is the BNSS that is applicable, then there is a specific provision enabling such sampling. The reasoning was also that mere furnishing of a sample of the fingerprint, signature or handwriting would not incriminate the person as such. It would have to be compared with the material discovered on investigation, which alone could incriminate the person giving the sample, which would not fall under a testimonial compulsion, thus not falling foul of the rule against self-incrimination. 10. We hence do not find any reason to uphold the impugned order and set it aside. The 2nd respondent shall act in accordance with the order passed by the Magistrate. 11. The appeal is hence allowed reversing the order of the High Court and restoring that of the Magistrate. 12. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. ....................CJI. (B. R. Gavai) ......................J. (K. Vinod Chandran) New Delhi; October 13, 2025. 1 (2019) 8 SCC 1 2 AIR 1961 SC 1808